UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Slip Op. 25-154

In AGS Company Automotive Solutions and Turn5, Inc. et. Al. (Consolidated Plaintiffs) v. U.S. Customs and Border  Protection; Rodney S. Scott, in his official capacity as commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and The United States of America, Consol. Court No. 25-00255, (December 15, 2025), the court considered Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction suspending liquidation of certain entries currently dutiable under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”). As the courts have vacated and enjoined the orders imposing these tariffs (see V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, 149 F.4th 1312, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2025), currently pending before the Supreme Court) Plaintiffs here seek to enjoin liquidation. The Court here denied the injunction for Plaintiffs’ failure to demonstrate irreparable harm from liquidation.

The Court cited the severity of imposing a preliminary injunction (“PI”) acknowledging that “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). In order to reward a party a PI, a party must show the “(1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm absent immediate relief, (3) the balance of interests weighing in favor of relief, and (4) that the injunction serves the public interest.” Silfab Solar, Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). Plaintiffs contended that regardless of SCOTUS’s ruling in the pending case, liquidation could pose a risk to recovery by means of protest as Custom’s act of liquidating could be seen as purely administerial. However, the Government has made its position clear that it will not oppose court orders for reliquidation.

Further, the Court explains that the doctrine of judicial estoppel would prevent the Government from taking an approach inconsistent with the above after a final result is entered in the pending V.O.S. case. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001); see also Sumecht NA, Inc. v. United States, 923 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Effectively, this means that the Government will be estopped from “assum[ing] a contrary position” to deny refunds after liquidation. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 749.

Plaintiffs’ also raise the Court’s previous grant of PIs where there was uncertainty of the Court’s ability to order reliquidation and refunds in 19 U.S.C. § 1581(i) cases. See In re Section 301 Cases (“301 Cases”). However, the Court here suggests that the Government’s unequivocal assurance that it “will not oppose or object to the [c]ourt’s authority to order reliquidation,” (Gov’t Resp. at 1) is sufficient to deny the Plaintiffs’ request. Further, the Court acknowledges, as it did in the 301 Cases, that the Court has “the explicit power to order reliquidation and refunds where the government has unlawfully exacted duties.” Id. at 1363. As Plaintiffs’ will have the option to first file protests to preserve a right to reliquidation under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c), (a)), or alternatively, have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the Plaintiffs will not suffer ‘irreparable harm’ with liquidation. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for hearing is moot, and the PI is denied.

Slip Op. 25-151

In Kingtom Aluminio S.R.L. v. United States; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Alejandro N. Mayorkas in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Troy A. Miller in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and Aluminum Extruders Council and United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union Court No. 24-00264, (December 12, 2025), Defendants sought reconsideration of the Court’s vacating of Custom’s finding of forced labor under 19 U.S.C § 1307 in Kingtom Aluminio S.R.L. v. United States, Slip Op. 25-125, 2025 WL 2709428 (CIT Sep. 23, 2025). The Court here denied that motion for reconsideration.

The court previously found the Customs ruling of forced labor to be arbitrary and capricious, prompting it to vacate and remand the case. Defendants here claimed that the previous CIT decision was based on a mistake of fact and law. The alleged mistake of fact involved the Court’s conflation of Enforce and Protect Act (“EAPA”) verification findings with the forced labor investigation, which the Court here conceded. However, the Court held this to be a harmless mistake not giving rise to a “clear factual . . . error.” See Keystone Auto. Operations, Inc. v. United States, 781 F. Supp. 3d 1362, 1366 (CIT 2025). Such harmless errors do not give rise to reconsideration. See Eregli Demir Ve Celik Fabrikalari T.A.S. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 639 F. Supp. 3d 1245, 1252 (CIT 2023). The Court cited the “harmless error” rule (USCIT Rule 61) as consistent with this finding. The Court’s reliance on the EAPA verification was largely due to it comprising part of the public administrative record (“PAR”), as opposed to the allegation assessment (which it inadvertently cited) which was part of the confidential record not part of the Court’s previous finding.

As to the proposed mistake of law, Defendants alleged that the Court failed to consider the appropriate two-prong test set forth by the Federal Circuit in determining whether vacatur was proper. See Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocs., Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affs. (“NOVA”), 260 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001). This test requires a consideration of both “the seriousness of the order’s deficiencies . . . and the disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed.” Id. at 1380. The Court determined that this consideration was unnecessary as the Defendants did not respond to the Plaintiff’s request for vacatur contained within the motion for judgment on the agency record, citing that “remand with vacatur is the default remedy for agency actions deemed unlawful under [5 U.S.C.] § 706(2)(A).” Maui and Hector’s Dolphin Defs. NZ Inc. v. NMFS, Slip Op. 25-113, 2025 WL 2452468, at *13 (CIT 2025). Further, a motion made for the first time in a motion for consideration is considered too late and deemed waived. See Bluebonnet Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 466 F.3d 1349, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

The CIT denied the Defendant’s motion for reconsideration for the reasons stated above. Finding no mistake of law and only a harmless error in the Court’s consideration of the EAPA verification, the Court issued an errata sheet for its previous opinion and upheld the vacatur.